

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/22 :

CIA-RDP86T00268R000400050021-2

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDI

*5/10/59  
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ymc*

This is now main agenda item for Friday  
PB (War Objectives scratched). Urge you leaf  
through attachments, as I have strong feeling  
it has turned out to be a futile exercise  
(see my memo).

RWK

*6/1/59*

5 February 1959  
(DATE)

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5 February 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDI

SUBJECT : Conclusions Drawn from Lebanon-Iraq and Taiwan Straits Crises

1. This exercise was first laid on last October. GG said that SecState proposed topic originally for NSC discussion, and that JFD did this so seldom that he, Gray, wanted to follow through. It has since become a personal project of Mr. Gray's.

2. However, we and Budget were the only ones to comply initially. Budget raised some obviously tendentious points, e.g. our airlift is adequate, military and economic aid didn't buy us much (in Iraq), etc. We submitted a brief but at least honest statement of CIA-type problems, based on a DDP/NE brief (FE/DDP said Quemoy so successful, no need for lessons to be learned). NE has since expanded and revised this, but I did not send it in, for reasons given below.

3. State came through in December with a very feeble effort, combining a general whitewash with some piddling complaints about State-military coordination. Defense has procrastinated for months, Triebel saying that delay was caused by "very conscientious" effort being made. We still do not have the Defense-JCS paper, but I will be very surprised it if adds much. USIA submitted an analysis of Free World press reaction to Lebanon and Quemoy (largely unfavorable). I had FBID do a quick rundown on radio, which is broadly identical.—

4. Hence I feel very strongly that there simply is not enough meat in any of the submissions to provide a good basis for NSC discussion. The big "lessons" as to the desirability and overall impact of such armed interventions, whether or not our limwar capabilities are adequate, etc., are not really explored. Instead we have a lot of mutual backscratching and/or minor operational points, rather than broad-gauge policy "lessons" of NSC interest. Moreover, the sheaf of disparate papers now assembled is too much for any NSC member, so PB would presumably have to do a summary (which could not be left to NSC staff, since I'm sure neither you nor State would buy such propositions as Lebanon proves the adequacy of our airlift). Therefore, I urge that you propose junking the exercise on the grounds that we simply don't have enough meat in this pie.

*R. W. Komer*  
R. W. KOMER